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This paper analyzes changes in the progressivity of the Social Security benefit formula as a means
of lessening the risk inherent in investment-based Social Security reform.  Focusing on a single cohort
of workers, it simulates the distribution of benefits subject to both earnings and financial risks in a
reformed system in which solvency has been restored and traditional benefits have been augmented
by personal retirement accounts (PRAs).  The simulations show that some investment in equities is
desirable in all cases.  However, switching from the current benefit formula to the maximally progressive
formula -- a flat benefit independent of earnings -- improves the welfare of the the bottom 30 percent
of the earnings distribution even if they reduce their PRA investments in equity to zero.  An additional
30 percent of earners can lessen their equity investments without loss of welfare under the maximally
progressive formula.  Intermediate approaches in which traditional benefit replacement rates for lower
earnings are reduced by less than those for higher earnings allow about half of the equity risk to be
eliminated for the lowest earnings decile.   Sensitivity tests show that these patterns are robust to different
assumptions about risk aversion, the equity premium, and the size of the personal retirement accounts









  Around the globe, traditional pay-as-you-go Social Security systems are facing 
financial challenges due to demographic changes.  With fertility rates at or below 
replacement levels in developed countries and life expectancy in retirement projected to 
continue increasing, the ratio of beneficiaries to workers will rise over the coming 
decades, increasing annual costs relative to income.  The imminent retirement of the 
Baby Boom generation in many developed countries has focused attention on the need 
for reform.
1 
  Over the past decade and more, many analysts have proposed that at least some of 
the financial shortfalls be eliminated through the prefunding of future benefits, in order to 
ameliorate the increase in pay-as-you-go tax rates on future generations of workers that 
would otherwise be required.
2  Prefunding can more readily take place in a system of 
decentralized Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs) than in the Social Security Trust 
Fund, particularly when it is desired to exploit the risk-return tradeoff inherent in the 
equity premium and to separate the incremental saving due to higher Social Security 
taxes from the rest of the federal government’s budget.
3 
  The possibility that Social Security benefits paid from personal accounts would be 
subject to financial risk due to stock return volatility, in turn, has focused attention on 
ways limit the risk in investment-based Social Security reform.  Financial risk is of 
particular concern with respect to low-income beneficiaries, for whom Social Security 
                                                 
1 The Social Security Trustees Report 2006 projects an increase in the number of beneficiaries per hundred 
workers from 30 in 2005 to 49 in 2040 to 53 in 2080 (Table IV.B2).  For an international description of the 
demographic challenge, see World Bank (1994). 
2 The Office of the Chief Actuary at the Social Security Administration has formally analyzed over two 
dozen proposals.  See the memoranda at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/ . 
3 See Samwick (1999, 2004) for further discussion of the role of PRAs in prefunding future entitlement 
benefits.    2
benefits make up a disproportionate share of their retirement income.  Two principal 
methods of limiting financial risk have been explored in the recent literature.  The first is 
to offer a guarantee to workers that benefits will not fall below a particular threshold 
(e.g., 90 percent of scheduled benefits).  Feldstein and Ranguelova (2001a,b) demonstrate 
that such guarantees can be implemented via long-term options on a stock market index 
in a manner similar to conventional portfolio insurance.  The second method is to follow 
popular financial planning strategies that reduce the portfolio allocation in equities as a 
worker approaches retirement.  Poterba, Rauh, Venti, and Wise (2006) explore the 
efficacy of using such “life cycle” strategies in this context. 
  These two mechanisms share the feature that they introduce bonds (preferably as 
inflation-indexed securities) into the portfolio in order to lessen the exposure to equity 
risk.  However, in doing so, these mechanisms give up the equity premium and thus lose 
one very important rationale for including PRAs in the reform.  In contrast, the analysis 
below considers an alternative approach based on modifications to the traditional benefit 
to protect low-earning workers while leaving all workers free to choose their own PRA 
portfolios.  Such an approach may prove to be useful, particularly because any 
restrictions on the portfolio allocations in the PRAs beyond the determination of which 
investment choices will be offered are likely to be untenable as the accounts become 
larger and more popular.   
  The most direct way to make sure that low-earning workers do not fall into 
poverty in old age is to increase the progressivity of the benefit formula in the scaled-
down version of the traditional system that remains after reform.  Doing so would lessen 
the need to provide insurance against possibly low returns in the PRAs, because low-   3
income retirees would depend less on the PRAs to stay out of poverty.  To be sure, there 
have been discussions of progressive reductions in the traditional benefits as part of a 
plan to close the financial gap while protecting low-earning workers.  This paper adds to 
the literature by quantifying the effect of such changes to the traditional benefit formula 
on the need to invest PRAs in equity rather than bonds to achieve a given level of 
welfare. 
  This paper illustrates the link between progressivity and risk using a stylized 
framework based on simulations of earnings trajectories and portfolio returns.  The 
simulations are based on the projected experience of a cohort of workers corresponding 
roughly to those born in 1973.  To calibrate the simulations, traditional retirement 
benefits are reduced by 40 percent, an amount comparable to what is projected to be 
required to restore annual balance to the system in the long term.
4  The simulations pair 
reductions in the traditional benefits of this magnitude with PRAs funded by 
contributions of 2 percent of covered earnings each year.  The main comparisons are 
between the utility-maximizing portfolio allocations to equities across the new 
configurations of the traditional benefit that are more versus less progressive.   
  The key finding is that under baseline parameters, the most progressive traditional 
benefit—a flat benefit independent of earnings—allows the bottom 30 percent of the 
earnings distribution to achieve a higher expected utility than under the proportional 
reductions to the current benefit formula even if they reduce their PRA investments in 
                                                 
4 In 2080, the latest year of the projections in the Social Security Trustees Report 2006 (Table IV.B1), the 
annual gap is 5.38 percentage points of taxable payroll, compared to a cost rate (excluding disability 
insurance benefits) of 16.27 percentage points of taxable payroll.  Thus, the required reduction is 
5.38/16.27 = 33 percent.  However, this figure assumes that all benefits—including those of current 
retirees—can be cut by this amount.  The need to protect benefits already in payment would lead to a 
higher cut to benefits yet to be paid.    4
equity to zero.  An additional 30 percent of earners can lessen their equity investments to 
some degree without loss of welfare relative to those available under the proportionally 
scaled-back current formula.  Under more realistic and less extreme changes to the 
traditional benefit, such as that proposed by Liebman, MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005), 
about half of the equity risk can be eliminated for the lowest earnings decile, and some 
equity risk can be eliminated for the bottom six deciles.  The optimal allocation to 
equities in the PRA is not particularly sensitive to the progressivity of the reductions in 
the traditional benefits—in most simulations, the share in equities increases slightly for 
low earners and decreases slightly for high earners with more progressive reductions in 
the traditional benefits. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II lays out the 
simulation framework for both the traditional benefits and the new system of PRAs.  
Section III discusses the combinations of PRA asset allocations and reductions in the 
traditional benefits that will be analyzed.  Section IV derives the certainty equivalent 
measure of expected utility that will be used in the comparisons.  Section V presents the 
baseline results, and Section VI includes sensitivity tests and a comparison to life cycle 
investment strategies.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II. The Simulation Framework 
  The model used in the analysis focuses on a cohort of workers who should expect 
to have their traditional benefits reduced at some point when the Social Security system is 
restored to solvency.  Specifically, the analysis simulates the experience of the birth 
cohort of 1973, who will reach their normal retirement age in 2040, just as the Social    5
Security trust fund is presently projected to be exhausted.  Trust Fund exhaustion will 
necessitate changes to the system, even if they have not been made before that time.  The 
analysis assumes, counterfactually, that the workers have been in the new system since 
they entered the workforce.   
  The distribution of earnings at an initial age is assumed to be lognormal, allowing 
its parameters to be estimated from the mean and median of a sample of data.  Kunkel 
(1996) reports the mean and quartiles of the distribution of earnings by age group for the 
years 1980-1993 based on a detailed sample of Social Security records.  The population 
of 30 year olds in this analysis is approximated by the 25 – 34 year old cohort in 
Kunkel’s data, and parameters of the lognormal are estimated for each year of Kunkel’s 
sample.
5  These parameters are averaged across all the sample years, and the resulting 
distribution is scaled up by the growth in the average wage index in Social Security 
through 2003, the last year for which an estimate of that index is currently available in 
SSA (2006).  To allow for the analysis of the distributional consequences of changes to 
the Social Security benefit formula, the lognormal distribution is approximated by ten 
workers who fall at the midpoints of the deciles of that distribution.   
  For each such worker, earnings evolve over the life cycle due to deterministic 
changes in expected earnings and stochastic shocks to earnings around expected earnings.  
The results of the analyses below are the distributions of simulated benefits, where 
simulations are conducted with 5,000 independent replicates for each of the ten workers 
representing the deciles of the initial distribution of earnings.  The processes for the 
                                                 
5 The median and mean of a lognormal distribution are given by exp(µ) and exp(µ + 0.5*σ
2), respectively, 
where exp( ) denotes the exponential function and µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the 
underlying normal distribution.  The median therefore identifies µ and the ratio identifies σ.  The estimated 
parameters for the group discussed in the text are {10.2056, 0.5271}.    6
growth in expected earnings are assumed to be identical for all replicates of all workers.  
Expected earnings grow each year due to the growth in the national average wage, 
approximated here by the average real growth rate of Social Security covered wages 
during the 1952-2003 period, or 1.1 percent per year.  Expected earnings also follow an 
age-earnings profile, reflecting changes in individual productivity and hours worked over 
the life cycle.  Each worker is assumed to face the age-earnings profile for the least 
educated group of workers analyzed by Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994).
6  
Stochastic deviations from expected earnings follow an AR(1) process with a correlation 
coefficient of ρ = 0.95 and a standard deviation of 15 percent.
7  Given these parameters, 
annual earnings are backcasted from the initial distribution at age 30 (deterministically, at 
the average rate of earnings growth) to age 21 and then forecasted to age 67.
8 
  The Social Security benefit formula depends on the growth in the national average 
wage in two places: to determine the maximum taxable earnings on which payroll taxes 
are paid and to index each year of earnings for the growth of aggregate earnings during a 
worker’s career.  Since the framework focuses on the deciles of a single age cohort, the 
growth in the national average wage is approximated by the growth rate of this cohort’s 
average earnings over its career.  Maximum taxable earnings subject to the payroll tax are 
projected forward and backward from 2003 (age 30) using this growth rate.  With these 
few assumptions, it is possible to get a reasonable approximation of Social Security 
benefits by applying the benefit formula to the simulated earnings profiles. 
                                                 
6 This profile is approximated by having real earnings grow at annual rates of 2.5 percent between ages 21 
and 30, 1.7 percent between 31 and 40, 0.5 percent between 41 and 50, and -1.3 percent through age 67.  
This growth is in addition to the growth in the national average wage. 
7 See Topel and Ward (1992) for other, comparable estimates of the wage process. 
8 Largely because the sample is constructed around a single deterministic age-earnings profile and is 
assumed to be fully employed each year, it understates the cross-sectional variation in annual earnings each 
year.  For example, the ratio of the 75
th to the 25
th percentiles of the earnings distribution at age 50 (or the 
age group 45-54) in the simulation is 2.59, compared to 3.30 in Kunkel’s (1996) sample.    7
  In each of the policy scenarios, the traditional benefit is reduced by 40 percent in 
the aggregate and is augmented by the benefits payable from a PRA.  PRA contributions 
are 2 or 3 percent of earnings (depending on the scenario) up to the maximum taxable 
earnings level.  Asset returns are based on the annual total returns in Table 2-5 of 
Ibboston Associates (2006) for the years 1926 – 2005.  Asset classes include large stocks, 
small stocks, long-term corporate bonds, long-term government bonds, intermediate-term 
government bonds, and Treasury bills.  These returns are further combined in to an equity 
portfolio (75 percent large stocks and 25 percent small stocks), the corporate bond 
portfolio, and a government bond portfolio (one third in each of the long-term, 
intermediate-term, and bills).   Each age (e.g., 45) in each of the 5,000 replicates is 
assigned a random year of returns (e.g., 1973) from this 80-year span.  Each of the ten 
workers, corresponding to the deciles of the initial distribution of earnings, therefore 
receives the same sequence of return-years.  Portfolio allocations are as specified for each 
scenario.  At retirement, PRA balances are converted to inflation-indexed annuities at a 
real interest rate of 3 percent, matching the long-term bond return in the Trustees Report.
9 
 
III. Combining Personal Accounts with a Smaller Traditional Benefit 
  Several approaches to reducing traditional pay-as-you-go benefits are considered, 
all of which reduce aggregate payouts by 40 percent (because all are designed to restore 
solvency to the same degree).  They differ in the extent to which they protect the benefits 
of low-earners, whose total retirement incomes are more vulnerable to the financial risk 
                                                 
9 The annuity factor is derived from the period life table from 2002, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html.  A dollar of PRA balance translates into $1/13.15 in 
annual inflation-indexed benefits.  The denominator in this figure is the average of the two factors for men 
(12.3) and women (14.0), respectively.    8
that may come from PRAs.  At one extreme is a proportional reduction in the traditional 
benefits, in which the entire benefit formula is scaled down by 40 percent.  This approach 
leaves the progressivity of the traditional benefit unchanged and is referred to as the 
Proportional Reduction.  At the other extreme, the most progressive way to reduce 
traditional benefits is to pay each beneficiary the same amount, regardless of earnings.  In 
this case, Social Security would play a flat benefit equal to the mean benefit in the system 
(scaled down by 40 percent).  This method is referred to as the Uniform Benefit below. 
  Between these two extremes lie other possible approaches.  One possibility is to 
use a weighted average of the two extremes.  The simulations below consider a Half and 
Half benefit formula which combines the Proportional Reduction and Uniform Benefit 
and then divides the total by two.  Another approach is to reduce benefits progressively 
based on features of the current benefit formula.  For example, in the reform plan 
presented by Liebman, MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005), the replacement rates are 
lowered by 25 percent below the first bend point in the formula (from 90 to 67.5 percent) 
and 50 percent above the first and second bend points (from 32 and 15 percent to 16 and 
7.5 percent).
10  
  In a reformed system, PRAs are added to the traditional benefits to help maintain 
total retirement replacement rates.  The asset allocation decision in PRAs in this 
framework is simply a question of equity relative to bonds.  The simulations below 
consider time-invariant allocations to equity ranging from 0 to 100, effectively assuming 
                                                 
10 See SSA (2006) for a description of the Social Security benefit formula.  See Goss and Wade (2005) for 
an evaluation of the Liebman, MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005) plan. Both documents can be found at 
http://www.nonpartisanssplan.com for reference.    9
annual rebalancing to meet this allocation target.
11  For purposes of comparison, three 
“life cycle” strategies are also simulated, in which the allocation to stocks averages 50 
percent but declines linearly with age at rates of 1.0, 1.5, or 2.0 percentage points per 
year.   
  When it evaluates Social Security reform plans, the Office of the Chief Actuary at 
the Social Security Administration assigns mean returns by asset type.  In recent 
evaluations, such as Goss and Wade (2005), mean returns have been assumed to be 6.2 
percent for equity, 3.2 percent for corporate bonds, and 2.7 for government bonds, net of 
both inflation and a modest 30 basis point administrative cost.  The baseline simulations 
utilize these assumptions.  To capture the volatility around the mean, the historical 
variation in asset returns from 1926 – 2005 reported by Ibbotson Associates (2006) is 
utilized.  Standard deviations are 22.2 percent for equity, 9.2 percent for corporate bonds, 
and 6.6 percent for government bonds.  All simulations preserve these standard 
deviations but change the mean returns (by the difference between the specified mean 
return and the mean of the historical data), allowing for potentially lower equity 





                                                 
11 In reality, a worker might choose to vary the allocation to equities over time as a response to realizations 
of both earnings and investment returns. The assumption of constant allocations throughout the life-cycle 
greatly simplifies the analysis, in order to focus on the main tradeoff of progressivity in the benefit formula 
against the need for low-earning workers to exploit the equity premium.  The extension to a dynamic 
programming that solves for the optimal portfolio is a subject for future work. 
12 Social Security reform proposals that include PRAs often stipulate that the balance can be bequeathed.  
Bequests are not modeled in this analysis, but this is not an important omission.  Allowing for bequests 
would simply raise the required contribution rate to the PRA to ensure that the 2 or 3 percentage points 
specified in the simulations go to fund the annuities.     10
IV.  Evaluating Risk in Retirement Benefits 
  In the main simulations, workers are assumed to have constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility functions, defined over total retirement benefits, b, with risk 
aversion coefficient γ: 








b u  
  Expected utility for the worker representing each decile of the initial wage 
distribution is calculated as the average value of u(b) across 5,000 independently drawn 
replicates.  It therefore encompasses the uncertainty in both portfolio returns and 
earnings, while also allowing for comparisons across different deciles in the initial 
earnings distribution.
13  As a basis for comparison across configurations of the traditional 
benefit formula and the PRA asset allocation rules, we can calculate the certainty 
equivalent benefit: 
   () ( ) () []
() () []
() γ γ γ γ
− − − = − =
1 1 1 1 1 1 b E b u E bCE  
  The certainty equivalent is the retirement benefit that, if received with certainty, 
would make the individual equally well off as facing the uncertain benefit distribution.  
For a risk averse individual, the certainty equivalent will be less than the expected benefit 
level, E(b).  A higher certainty equivalent indicates a higher expected utility, and 
differences in certainty equivalents correspond to risk premiums measured in dollar 
terms. 
                                                 
13 Defining the deciles with respect to initial earnings is appropriate in the current framework in which 
workers are assumed to adopt a single, time-invariant allocation to equities in their PRAs.  An alternative 
approach to doing distributional analysis would use a measure of average lifetime earnings to assign 
workers to deciles.  For example, some workers in the lowest initial earnings decile receive a number of 
very positive earnings draws and wind up higher in the distribution of lifetime earnings.  For comparison, 
assigning workers to deciles based on their average indexed monthly earnings yields an allocation to 
deciles with a correlation of 0.83 with the deciles of the initial earnings distribution.    11
  By construction, the aggregate expected benefits from the traditional system are 
identical across all policy scenarios, conditional on the earnings realizations.  This is not 
true within each decile, as some benefit formulas are designed to be more progressive 
than others and thus provide differential expected benefits to different deciles.  Other 
differences in certainty equivalents across the policy scenarios reflect different exposure 
to risk, whether through the traditional benefit formula or the PRA investment portfolio, 
or different expected benefits through the PRA investment portfolio. 
 
V. Trading off Progressivity and Risk 
  Figure 1 illustrates the impact of the benefit formula and the equity share of the 
PRA portfolio on expected benefits.  The graph shows the relationship between expected 
benefits and the equity share in the PRA portfolio for the highest and lowest earnings 
deciles under three different benefit formulas: Proportional Reduction, Progressive, and 
Uniform Benefit.  The curves for the top decile earner go in that order, and the curves for 
the bottom decile go in the reverse order.  The Proportional Reduction is most generous 
for the top decile and least generous for the bottom decile.  The Uniform Benefit is the 
opposite—most generous for the bottom decile and least generous for the top decile.  The 
Progressive benefit reduction actually tracks the Proportional Reduction fairly closely.  
The Half and Half benefit formula (not shown) would fall exactly between the 
Proportional Reduction and Uniform Benefit.
14  Because the risk premium on equities is 
positive, expected benefits increase in all cases with the portfolio share in equities.  For 
                                                 
14 For the bottom decile, the reductions in the average traditional benefit relative to current law are 40, 37.6, 
32.2, and 24.3 percent for the Proportional, Progressive, Half and Half, and Uniform Benefit formulas, 
repectively.  For the top decile, the corresponding reductions are 40, 41.7, 45.6, and 51.1 percent.  
Appendix Table 1 contains the mean benefits by earnings decile for each traditional benefit formula and for 
2% PRAs with investments ranging from 0 to 100 percent equity, in 25-percentage-point increments.    12
workers in the bottom (top) decile, increases in the equity share in the PRA portfolio and 
increases (decreases) in the progressivity of the traditional benefit formula are two 
different ways to increase the expected benefit level. 
  Figure 2 shows the impact of benefit risk on the expected utility of portfolio 
choices in the PRA.  The horizontal axis shows the portfolio share of the PRAs invested 
in equities, and the vertical axis shows the dollar amount of the expected benefits or 
expected utility (expressed as a certainty equivalent).  The highest curve shows the 
expected benefits from a traditional benefit based on the current formula, reduced by 40 
percent to restore solvency, combined with a PRA funded by contributions of 2 percent 
of taxable payroll per year.  (This is the same curve as the top curve in Figure 1.)  The 
graph is for the highest decile of the earnings distribution.  Expected benefits increase 
slightly faster than linearly with the equity share of the portfolio.  With a coefficient of 
relative risk aversion of 1, the certainty equivalent is increasing with the equity share in 
the portfolio, though the increase occurs at a decreasing rate.  The optimal equity share is 
therefore 100.  As the coefficients of relative risk aversion increase to 3 and 5 in the next 
two curves, the optimal equity share falls to 80 percent and 60 percent, respectively.
15   
  Figures 3 – 6 and Table 1 combine the elements of the first two figures to 
compare certainty equivalents by earnings decile and equity portfolio share for each of 
the four possible formulas for the traditional benefit.  Figure 3 shows the results for the 
lowest earnings decile in the baseline case: PRAs funded by contributions of 2 percent of 
taxable payroll, a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 3, and real rates of return 
                                                 
15 The extent of risk aversion can be illustrated by considering how much an individual would pay to avoid 
a specified risk.  Consider a 50-50 chance of having wealth increase or decrease by 25 percent.  An 
individual with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3 would pay about 9.1 percent of his wealth to 
avoid this risk.  An investor with log utility (a coefficient of 1) would pay only 3.2 percent, while an 
investor with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 5 would pay 13.5 percent.    13
on asset classes—equity, corporate bonds, and government bonds—having the values 
assumed by Goss and Wade (2005) in the Social Security Administration’s official 
scoring of reform proposals: 6.2, 3.2, and 2.7 percent, respectively.   
  The four curves in Figure 3 correspond to the certainty equivalents as a function 
of the PRA portfolio share in equity for the Proportional Reduction, Progressive, Half 
and Half, and Uniform Benefit formulas.  In all cases, the highest certainty equivalent 
occurs at a portfolio share of 100 percent in equities, where the curves intersect the right 
vertical axis.  The differing degree of progressivity across the benefit formulas means that 
the formulas differ in the level of the certainty equivalents at this optimal portfolio share, 
with the most progressive benefit formula having the highest certainty equivalent.  With a 
more progressive traditional benefit, a worker could choose to reduce the equity share—
and with it, the volatility of the PRA benefit—while still surpassing the expected utility 
afforded by a less progressive benefit formula.  For example, with the Uniform Benefit 
and the Half and Half benefit formula, a worker could allocate none of the PRA portfolio 
to equity and still have a higher certainty equivalent than with the Proportional Reduction 
benefit formula and a 100 percent allocation to equity.  This can be seen in Figure 3 in 
the greater height of the Uniform Benefit and Half and Half curves on the left vertical 
axis than the Proportional Reduction achieves on the right vertical axis.  For the 
Progressive formula, an equity share as low as 50 percent is enough to exceed the 
certainty equivalent generated by the Proportional Reduction and its optimal 100 percent 
equity share. 
  These comparisons are summarized in Table 1.  The first panel shows the 
maximum certainty equivalents for each benefit formula (in the columns) and each decile    14
of the earnings distribution (in the rows), where the maximum is chosen over equity 
shares that are multiples of 5 between 0 and 100.  The second panel shows, for each 
earnings decile and benefit formula, the equity share that gives that maximum certainty 
equivalent.  Finally, the bottom panel shows, for all benefit formulas that are not the 
Proportional Reduction, the lowest equity share (again, in multiples of 5), that will 
surpass the maximum certainty equivalent available under the Proportional Reduction.  
This panel will only have rows for earnings deciles in which this is possible.  For 
example, a Uniform Benefit with an equity share of zero surpasses a Proportional 
Reduction with any equity share (including the maximum, at 100 percent) for the lowest 
three earnings deciles. 
  Figure 4 shows the same relationships for the earnings decile that is fourth from 
the bottom (roughly the 35
th percentile).  The curves are in the same order as in Figure 3, 
and the maximum certainty equivalents continue to occur at portfolio allocations of 100 
percent equity.  However, the vertical distances between the curves have narrowed, since 
benefit formulas that have the same average payout but differ in progressivity will 
redistribute relatively less to the fourth decile than they do to the bottom decile.  The 
maximum certainty equivalent for the Proportional Reduction formula can now be 
surpassed with equity allocations as low as 30 percent, 50 percent, and 75 percent for the 
Uniform Benefit, Half and Half, and Progressive benefit formulas, respectively.  The 
bottom panel of Table 1 shows that there is some potential for reducing the required 
exposure to equity by having a more progressive benefit formula for each of the bottom 
six deciles, though the potential shrinks at higher deciles.    15
  Figure 5 shows the same curves for the seventh decile (roughly the 65
th 
percentile) of the earnings distribution.  The ordering of the curves has now switched, 
with the Proportional Reduction offering the highest certainty equivalents for each 
possible equity share, followed by the Progressive, Half and Half, and Uniform Benefit 
formulas.  This is not surprising, as the redistribution toward the lower earning deciles 
must be paid for by those in higher earning deciles if the reforms have the same aggregate 
payouts but differ in their progressivity.  The optimal equity allocations have fallen 
slightly, to 95 percent in equity for the Proportional Reduction and Progressive formulas 
and to 90 percent in equity for the Half and Half and Uniform Benefit formulas. All of 
the curves are quite close together, indicating very little scope for trading off exposure to 
equity by switching benefit formulas.  Figure 6 shows the curves for the top decile of the 
earnings distribution.  The curves retain the same ordering from Figure 5, but the gaps 
between the different formulas are now much wider.  The optimal share in equity also 
falls to 75 percent for all four of the benefit formulas. 
  Figure 7 suggests why the progressivity of the benefit formula is such a powerful 
tool in comparison to the equity share of the PRA portfolio in affecting workers in the 
lower earnings deciles.  The figure shows the cumulative distribution functions for the 
four different benefit formulas, holding constant the equity share of the PRA portfolio at 
50 percent, for the bottom earnings decile.  For any given benefit level, the height of the 
curve shows the probability of the specified benefit formula generating a benefit level 
that is at or below the given level.  For curves that do not cross, the curve that is 
everywhere the lowest represents the most preferred benefit formula.  As noted above, for 
this low-earning worker, that is the Uniform Benefit.  Indeed, for this benefit formula, all    16
of the variation in benefit levels is due to the variation in asset returns in different 
scenarios.  Moving right to left on the graph, the other benefit formulas lower average 
benefits and add successively more earnings risk into the benefit distributions.  The 
differences in the lowest benefit amounts across formulas (measured by the horizontal 
distance between the curves near the horizontal axis) are quite large.  These differences 
also persist fairly high into the distribution of benefits, disappearing only at the highest 
benefit levels.  Given risk averse workers, the level and likelihood of very low outcomes 
are of particular concern.   
  Figure 8 shows the variation in this decile’s benefit distributions holding the 
benefit formula fixed (at Proportional Reduction) while varying the equity share in the 
portfolio from 0 to 100 percent in increments of 25 percentage points.  At the very lowest 
benefit levels, the differences across the portfolio allocations are quite small in 
comparison to those shown in Figure 7.  (The scales on the axes are identical across the 
figures.)  Low benefit outcomes are primarily due to the factor held constant across the 
curves—the traditional benefit formula—rather than the factor varying across the 
curves—the equity share in the PRA portfolio.  To the extent that there are differences, 
both the “All Equity” and “Zero Equity” portfolios have lower minimum benefits than 
more balanced portfolios. At the low end of the earnings distribution, reducing the equity 
share from 100 percent does not even generate a lower likelihood of very bad outcomes.   
  These figures establish the main results of the analysis.  Given the assumed 
average returns on equities and bonds and their historical variation, workers with CRRA 
utility and a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3 typically choose high equity shares 
in their PRA portfolios, regardless of the formula used to compute the traditional benefit.     17
However, switching from a proportional reduction in the traditional benefits to any of the 
three more progressive benefit formulas increases the traditional benefits going to the 
bottom six deciles of the earnings distribution.  This increase in traditional benefits gives 
the worker room to lower the equity share in the PRA portfolio while still achieving the 
same certainty equivalent available with the optimal equity share in the PRA under the 
proportionally reduced benefit.  In the case of the maximally progressive benefit formula, 
in which the traditional benefit is a uniform benefit unrelated to the worker’s earnings, 
the equity share could fall to zero for the lowest three deciles.  Higher deciles or less 
extreme changes to the progressivity of the benefit formula result in somewhat smaller 
possible reductions in equity exposure. 
 
VI. Sensitivity Tests 
  In this section, the robustness of the main results is assessed by varying the degree 
of risk aversion, the constancy of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the equity 
premium, and the size of the PRAs measured by the annual contributions as a percentage 
of earnings.  More risk aversion, declining relative risk aversion, a lower equity premium, 
and larger PRAs generally reduce the optimal portfolio allocations in equities and slightly 
compress the differences in the allocations across configurations of the traditional benefit 
that achieve the same certainty equivalent.  This section concludes with a discussion of 
life cycle portfolio strategies. 
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Risk Aversion 
  The baseline choice of the coefficient of risk aversion is consistent with 
assumptions found in the literature on insurance and risk.  Table 2 repeats the analysis of 
Table 1 for a higher coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 5.  The first consequence 
of higher relative risk aversion is that all of the certainty equivalents in the top panel of 
Table 2 are lower than their counterparts in Table 1.  Consistent with Figure 2, a worker 
with higher risk aversion would pay a greater risk premium to avoid a given risk.  The 
next panel of Table 2 shows that the workers seek to avoid this risk by reducing their 
equity shares in the PRA portfolio.
16  For example, with the Proportional Reduction, 
optimal equity shares are 95 percent in the lowest earnings decile, falling to 60 percent by 
the highest earnings decile.   
  As shown in the bottom panel of the table, changes in the progressivity of the 
traditional benefit allow for reductions in equity exposure in the PRA portfolio that are 
comparable to those for the less risk averse workers in Table 1.  For example, it is still the 
case that the bottom six earnings deciles have room to lower their equity exposure with 
more progressive traditional benefit formulas.  In addition, the allowable percentage point 
reductions in the equity shares are similar.  For example, with a Uniform Benefit, the 
bottom four deciles can now eliminate their equity exposure entirely.  With the 
Progressive benefit formula, the equity share for the bottom earnings decile can fall from 
95 to 25 percent without a loss in expected utility.  Thus, the main results are robust to a 
higher coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 
                                                 
16 In other words, the certainty equivalents would be even lower if the workers were constrained to hold the 
equity shares at the levels in the middle panel of Table 1.    19
Declining Relative Risk Aversion 
  The results in the middle panels of Tables 1 and 2 show that the optimal 
allocation to equity declines at higher earnings deciles.  This pattern arises due to the 
maintained assumption in the simulations that workers have no other sources of 
retirement income apart from the traditional benefit and the PRA.  Because even the 
current Social Security formula is progressive, workers in lower earnings deciles have a 
greater proportion of their retirement benefits insulated from investment risk.  With a 
homothetic expected utility function, this enables lower earning workers to take on more 
equity risk in their PRA portfolios.
17   
  This pattern is counterfactual—in reality, investment allocations to equity rise 
dramatically with earnings.
18  One way to make the simulations more consistent with 
observed investment behavior is to modify the expected utility function to exhibit 
declining, rather than constant, relative risk aversion.  The simplest such modification to 
make is to introduce a “subsistence level” of retirement benefit into the utility function, 
via the parameter k in: 









b u  
 Note  that  k = 0 corresponds to CRRA utility and that with k greater than zero, 
utility is not defined for retirement benefit levels below k.  For retirement benefit levels 
above k, utility is measured relative to the subsistence level.  Since low-earning deciles 
have benefits closest to this subsistence level, they will lower their equity allocations 
                                                 
17 This assumption also generates the tendency for more progressive benefit formulas to have higher 
optimal allocations to equity for the bottom earnings deciles and lower optimal allocations to equity for the 
top earnings deciles.  Greater progressivity results in more non-PRA benefits at low earnings deciles and 
less non-PRA benefits, relative to lifetime earnings, at high earnings deciles. 
18 See, for example, the tabulations in Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2006) or the multivariate estimates in 
Poterba and Samwick (2003), both based on data from the Surveys of Consumer Finances.    20
relative to the CRRA case.  The certainty equivalent for this DRRA expected utility 
function is given by: 
   () ( ) () []
() () () []
() γ γ γ γ
− − − − + = − + =
1 1 1 1 1 1 k b E k b u E k bCE  
  Tables 3 and 4 repeat the analyses in Tables 1 and 2 using this DRRA expected 
utility function.  The subsistence level is assumed to be $10,000, which is close to the 
minimum benefit for the lowest earning decile shown in Figure 7.  The top panels of the 
tables show that the certainty equivalents are lower when expected utility exhibits 
declining rather than constant relative risk aversion.
19  The middle panels of the tables 
show that optimal equity allocations are also lower with declining relative risk aversion.   
  However, comparisons of the changes in the optimal equity allocations by 
earnings decile and across traditional benefit formulas relative to the CRRA case are not 
straightforward.  For example, with γ = 3, equity shares with a Proportional Reduction in 
the traditional benefit fall from 75 to 65 percent over the earnings deciles, compared to a 
decline from 100 to 80 percent in the CRRA case, indicating less sensitivity to earnings 
decile.  However, with a Uniform Benefit, they fall from 95 to 60 percent over the 
earnings deciles, compared to a decline from 100 to 75 percent in the CRRA case, 
indicating more sensitivity to earnings decile.  Similar results hold for the higher risk 
aversion in Table 4 and in the differences across columns in the respective cases. 
  Nonetheless, the bottom panels of the tables show that changing from a 
Proportional Reduction to a more progressive benefit formula can lessen equity exposure 
by as much or more than in the CRRA case.  For example, with γ = 3, the bottom six 
                                                 
19 The degree of relative risk aversion for any expected utility function is given by –b*u’’( )/u’( ).  For the 
DRRA utility function, this expression is γ*b/(b – k), which is equal to the constant γ for k = 0.  When k > 
0, this expression declines toward γ as b increases.    21
deciles can again have their equity exposure reduced.  With a Uniform Benefit, the 
bottom four deciles can reduce equity exposure to zero without falling behind the 
Proportional Reduction.  The sixth decile can lower its equity share from 70 to 35 
percent, compared to a reduction from 95 to 80 percent in the CRRA case shown in Table 
1.  With the Progressive formula, the bottom decile can reduce its equity exposure down 
to zero and the sixth decile can reduce its equity share from 75 to 55 percent (compared 
to a reduction from 95 to 90 percent in the CRRA case).  The results in Table 4 at higher 
risk aversion levels are even more pronounced.  Thus, the main results shown in the 
previous section are robust to and strengthened by a switch to an expected utility function 
that exhibits declining rather than constant relative risk aversion. 
 
Lower Equity Premium 
  The sustainability of the premium that has existed to investments in equities 
historically has been the subject of considerable debate.  Particularly in the case of 
financial market returns, past performance may be an unreliable guide to future 
outcomes.  For example, if over the past 30 years, systematic risk in the stock market fell, 
then the appropriate rate of return to assume going forward would be lower.  However, 
during this period of time that risk fell, the reduction in risk would have generated 
abnormally high returns to equity.  These high holding period returns would have arisen 
precisely because future ex ante returns had fallen and would thus be a poor guide to 
forecasting those future returns.
20 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of the issues associated with choosing a real return on stocks for the long term, see the 
papers by John Campbell, Peter Diamond, and John Shoven in Social Security Advisory Board (2001).    22
  In light of such considerations, Table 5 reports the results of simulations in which 
the expected return on equities is lowered from 6.2 percent to 4.7 percent.  PRA 
contributions remain 2 percent of earnings per year, and the comparisons are shown for a 
CRRA utility function with a relative risk aversion coefficient of 3.  As expected, the 150 
basis point reduction in the equity premium lowers the certainty equivalents for all 
earnings deciles and benefit formulas, shown in the top panel.  The lower equity premium 
also shifts the optimal portfolio allocations to equity lower.  For the Proportional 
Reduction, equity shares range from 85 to 55 percent, compared to 100 to 80 percent in 
Table 1.  For the Uniform Benefit, equity shares range from 95 to 50 percent, compared 
to 100 to 75 percent in Table 1. 
  With a lower equity premium, there is greater scope for changes in the 
progressivity of the benefit formula to substitute for higher equity allocations.  The 
bottom panel of Table 5 shows that with a Uniform Benefit, the bottom four deciles can 
reduce their equity shares to zero to keep pace with the optimal allocations of 75 to 85 
percent in the Proportional Reduction case.  The sixth decile can reduce its equity share 
to 45 percent from 65 percent.  In Table 1, with the higher equity premium, this decile 
could reduce its equity share only to 80 percent from 95 percent.  Possible reductions in 
equity exposure for other benefit formulas are smaller than with the Uniform Benefit 
formula but similarly larger than their counterparts with the higher equity premium in 
Table 1.  Thus, the main results in the previous section are robust and even strengthened 
in the presence of a lower equity premium. 
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Larger Personal Retirement Accounts 
  Compared to the investment-based reform plans that have been proposed (see 
footnote 2), a PRA funded by only a 2 percent contribution is fairly small.  The ability of 
progressivity in the traditional benefit to offset financial risk in the PRAs depends on the 
relative size of the two benefits.  To investigate this dependence and extend the analysis 
to cover more of the range of proposed reforms, Table 6 presents the results of 
simulations in which the annual PRA contribution is increased from 2 to 3 percent of 
earnings.  The certainty equivalents in the top panel are all naturally higher than their 
counterparts in Table 1, since the additional 1-percent contributions are not accounted for 
by reduced consumption elsewhere in this framework.  The middle panel of the table 
shows that optimal equity allocations are slightly lower with the larger PRAs.  As the 
PRAs get larger relative to the traditional benefit, workers seek to mitigate their risk 
exposure through lower allocations to equity.   
  The bottom panel shows that the ability to offset equity exposure through more 
progressive traditional benefit formulas can be slightly lower or higher, depending on the 
earnings decile and benefit formula.  With a Uniform Benefit, the bottom two deciles can 
reduce their equity shares to zero to keep pace with the optimal allocations of 95 to 100 
percent in the Proportional Reduction case.  In Table 1, with the smaller PRAs, the 
bottom three deciles could eliminate all equity exposure.  The sixth decile can reduce its 
equity share to 65 percent from 85 percent, compared to a reduction to 80 percent from 
95 percent in Table 1.  For the Progressive benefit formula, reductions in equity exposure 
relative to the Proportional Reduction formula are comparable to those in Table 1.   
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Life Cycle Portfolios 
  As noted above, prior studies have analyzed the use of life cycle investment 
strategies to mitigate financial risk in PRAs.  Figure 9 compares a portfolio with an age-
invariant allocation of 50 percent to equity with three life cycle strategies that shift from 
equity to bonds as retirement approaches.  The first starts at a 95 percent equity share and 
decreases 2 percentage points per year, reaching 5 percent on the eve of retirement.  The 
second starts at an 83.75 percent equity share and decreases 1.5 percentage points per 
year, reaching 16.25 percent on the eve of retirement.  The third starts at a 72.5 percent 
equity share and decreases by 1 percentage point per year, reaching 27.5 percent on the 
eve of retirement.  All three strategies are centered on a 50 percent equity share, based on 
the simple average of the allocation rules by age.  The figure pertains to the lowest 
earnings decile and shows the cumulative distribution functions for each of the four 
investment options.   
  There are two important features of the graph.  First, the curves all lie virtually on 
top of each other.  There cannot be much of an improvement in expected utility by 
switching to a life cycle strategy if such a strategy results in a distribution of benefits that 
is so similar to the age-invariant portfolio allocation.  Second, the life cycle strategies lie 
above the age-invariant portfolio for all but the very lowest percentiles of the 
distributions, the more so the greater the decline in the equity allocation with age.  The 
reason is that the life cycle strategies do not have the same expected benefits as the age-
invariant portfolio, because the life cycle strategies focus the high-equity allocations on 
the early years, when many years of contributions are yet to be made.      25
  Thus, life cycle strategies may be desirable, but this is so in the current context 
primarily because they serve to reduce the overall level of equity exposure.  This may be 
a desirable goal—for example, if the equity premium is low enough or volatility of 
returns is high enough—but it can be achieved more straightforwardly with a simple 




  Policy makers seeking to design investment-based Social Security reform 
proposals have wrestled with the issue of how much financial risk is appropriate for 
individuals to bear.  Suggested methods of alleviating risk have focused on strategies that 
amount to requiring more bonds relative to equity in the Personal Retirement Accounts, 
whether through the purchase of guarantees or life cycle investment strategies.  It is 
worth emphasizing that most of the simulations in this paper suggest fairly high optimal 
allocations to equities, particularly by those in the lowest deciles of the earnings 
distribution.  Direct restrictions on equity holding in PRAs are likely to prove unpopular, 
particularly among those whose opportunities are most broadened by the chance to invest 
their mandatory contributions in equities.  This paper suggests another possibility for 
alleviating the consequences of financial risk; namely, increasing the progressivity of the 
traditional benefit.  Doing so insulates workers in the lower part of the benefit 
distribution against possibly adverse shocks to financial returns without constraining 
them to not invest in equities.      26
  The main simulations in the paper compare proportional reductions in traditional 
benefits with more progressive reductions.  The key finding is that under baseline 
parameters, the most progressive traditional benefit—a flat benefit independent of 
earnings—allows the allocation to equities to be reduced to zero for the lowest three 
earnings deciles relative to the optimal allocation when the traditional benefits are 
reduced proportionately based on the current formula.  The next three deciles are able to 
achieve some reduction in equity exposure as well.  Under less extreme changes to the 
traditional benefit, such as that proposed by Liebman, MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005), 
the allocation to equities can be decreased by half for the lowest earnings decile and by 
smaller fractions for an additional five deciles.  Sensitivity tests show that optimal 
allocations to equities typically decrease with higher risk aversion, declining risk 
aversion, a lower equity premium, or larger accounts, but the general pattern of results 
persists and in some cases allows for greater equity reduction through higher 
progressivity in the traditional benefit formula. 
  The results in this paper suggest two avenues for further research.  First, the 
present analysis used a very stylized model of the initial earnings distribution and its 
evolution over time to simulate the distribution of future benefits.  Actual data and more 
sophisticated time-series estimates could be incorporated.  Second, the present analysis 
focused on time-invariant portfolio allocations in the PRAs, which were further assumed 
to be the worker’s only source of investment wealth.  While the latter might be a 
reasonable approximation for the lowest earning households, higher earning households 
are likely to have existing holdings of equities that make the portfolio allocation decision 
in the PRA less consequential.  Extending the current framework to allow for optimal,    27
age-dependent portfolio allocations and for saving in accounts other than the PRAs would 
provide better estimates of the extent to which greater progressivity can protect low 
earners from investment risk and of the size of the welfare costs paid by higher earners 
for providing this protection.   28
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Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 16362 16948 18288 20151
2 18373 18817 19819 21185
3 19862 20194 20934 21925
4 21236 21466 21968 22621
5 22571 22700 22974 23307
6 23914 23950 24011 24044
7 25395 25333 25170 24888
8 27212 27035 26606 25946
9 29587 29268 28509 27375
10 33956 33381 32029 30058
Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 100 100 100 100
2 100 100 100 100
3 100 100 100 100
4 100 100 100 100
5 100 100 100 100
6 9 59 59 59 5
7 9 59 59 09 0
8 9 09 09 08 5
9 8 58 58 58 5
10 80 80 80 75
Decile Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
15 0 0 0
26 0 1 5 0
37 0 3 5 0
4 7 55 03 0
5 8 06 55 0
6 9 08 08 0
1) PRAs are funded by 2 percent contributions.
2) Equity returns average 6.2 percent (net of inflation and administrative costs).
3) Utility is Constant Relative Risk Aversion, with a coefficient of 3.
Lowest Equity Share with Higher Expected Utility than Proportional
Table 1: Optimal Portfolio Shares in Equity, Baseline Case
Notes:
Highest Certainty Equivalent
Optimal Equity Share of PRA Portfolio
 
    31
Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 15808 16419 17801 19705
2 17582 18059 19124 20547
3 18927 19298 20111 21168
4 20173 20447 21032 21762
5 21405 21578 21934 22349
6 22622 22706 22858 22982
7 23966 23952 23885 23703
8 25648 25515 25179 24630
9 27787 27519 26869 25866
10 31823 31297 30054 28223
Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 95 95 100 100
2 8 58 59 09 0
3 8 58 58 58 5
4 8 08 08 08 0
5 7 57 57 57 5
6 7 57 57 57 5
7 7 07 07 07 0
8 7 07 07 06 5
9 6 56 56 56 0
10 60 60 60 55
Decile Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
12 5 0 0
23 5 0 0
34 5 1 0 0
45 0 2 5 0
5 5 53 52 0
6 6 05 04 5
1) PRAs are funded by 2 percent contributions.
2) Equity returns average 6.2 percent (net of inflation and administrative costs).
3) Utility is Constant Relative Risk Aversion, with a coefficient of 5.
Table 2: Optimal Portfolio Shares in Equity, Higher Risk Aversion
Highest Certainty Equivalent
Optimal Equity Share of PRA Portfolio
Lowest Equity Share with Higher Expected Utility than Proportional
Notes:
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Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 15199 15946 17516 19558
2 17010 17605 18842 20398
3 18423 18894 19856 21028
4 19746 20101 20809 21634
5 21094 21320 21760 22240
6 22386 22510 22724 22893
7 23858 23862 23819 23648
8 25691 25555 25206 24626
9 28002 27711 27014 25941
10 32366 31796 30454 28472
Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 7 58 09 09 5
2 7 57 58 08 5
3 7 57 58 08 0
4 7 57 57 58 0
5 7 57 57 57 5
6 7 07 07 57 0
7 7 07 07 07 0
8 7 07 07 06 5
9 7 07 06 56 5
10 65 65 60 60
Decile Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 000
22 0 0 0
33 0 0 0
44 0 1 5 0
5 5 03 01 5
6 5 54 53 5
1) PRAs are funded by 2 percent contributions.
2) Equity returns average 6.2 percent (net of inflation and administrative costs).
3) Utility is Declining Relative Risk Aversion, with a coefficient of 3
      and susbsitence level of 10000.
Table 3: Optimal Portfolio Shares in Equity, Declining Relative Risk Aversion
Highest Certainty Equivalent
Optimal Equity Share of PRA Portfolio
Lowest Equity Share with Higher Expected Utility than Proportional
Notes:
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Decile Proportional Progressive Half and Half Uniform
1 14533 15356 17018 19109
2 16100 16791 18166 19822
3 17324 17913 19053 20358
4 18510 18986 19891 20872
5 19783 20120 20749 21391
6 20898 21154 21585 21939
7 22305 22414 22564 22577
8 24063 24010 23827 23418
9 26088 25889 25377 24524
10 30199 29705 28529 26748
Decile Proportional Progressive Half and Half Uniform
1 5 56 06 57 5
2 5 05 56 06 5
3 5 55 56 06 0
4 5 05 55 56 0
5 5 55 55 55 5
6 5 05 05 05 0
7 5 05 05 05 0
8 5 05 05 04 5
9 5 05 05 04 5
10 45 45 45 40
Decile Progressive  Half and Half Uniform
10 0 0
20 0 0
31 0 0 0
41 5 0 0
52 5 0 0
63 0 1 0 0
7 4 03 03 0
1) PRAs are funded by 2 percent contributions.
2) Equity returns average 6.2 percent (net of inflation and administrative costs).
3) Utility is Declining Relative Risk Aversion, with a coefficient of 5
      and susbsitence level of 10000.
Notes:
Table 4: Optimal Portfolio Shares in Equity, Higher and Declining Relative Risk Aversion
Highest Certainty Equivalent
Optimal Equity Share of PRA Portfolio
Lowest Equity Share with Higher Expected Utility than Proportional
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Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 15473 16045 17355 19178
2 17265 17694 18662 19984
3 18596 18916 19628 20580
4 19820 20040 20522 21147
5 21023 21146 21407 21723
6 22220 22255 22312 22340
7 23549 23490 23334 23061
8 25162 24994 24588 23963
9 27275 26972 26256 25192
10 31185 30639 29366 27510
Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 8 59 09 09 5
2 8 08 08 08 5
3 7 57 57 57 5
4 7 57 57 57 5
5 7 07 07 07 0
6 6 56 56 56 5
7 6 56 56 56 0
8 6 06 06 06 0
9 6 06 05 55 5
10 55 55 50 50
Decile Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 000
21 5 0 0
32 5 0 0
43 5 5 0
54 5 2 5 5
6 5 55 04 5
1) PRAs are funded by 2 percent contributions.
2) Equity returns average 4.7 percent (net of inflation and administrative costs).
3) Utility is Constant Relative Risk Aversion, with a coefficient of 3.
Table 5: Optimal Portfolio Shares in Equity, Lower Equity Returns
Highest Certainty Equivalent
Optimal Equity Share of PRA Portfolio
Lowest Equity Share with Higher Expected Utility than Proportional
Notes:
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Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 17628 18231 19608 21522
2 20000 20460 21500 22921
3 21780 22126 22898 23936
4 23440 23681 24213 24908
5 25066 25205 25503 25874
6 26725 26771 26854 26921
7 28569 28515 28371 28118
8 30872 30698 30279 29639
9 33896 33578 32824 31702
10 39522 38941 37579 35590
Decile Proportional Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
1 100 100 100 100
2 95 95 100 100
3 9 59 59 59 5
4 9 09 09 09 0
5 8 58 58 58 5
6 8 58 58 58 5
7 8 08 08 08 0
8 8 08 08 07 5
9 7 57 57 57 5
10 70 70 70 65
Decile Progressive Half  and  Half Uniform
15 0 0 0
26 0 2 5 0
3 6 53 51 0
4 7 05 03 0
5 7 06 04 5
6 8 07 06 5
1) PRAs are funded by 3 percent contributions.
2) Equity returns average 6.2 percent (net of inflation and administrative costs).
3) Utility is Constant Relative Risk Aversion, with a coefficient of 3.
Table 6: Optimal Portfolio Shares in Equity, Larger PRAs
Highest Certainty Equivalent
Optimal Equity Share of PRA Portfolio
Lowest Equity Share with Higher Expected Utility than Proportional
Notes:
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Proportional Half and Half Progressive Uniform Benefit   39








































Proportional Half and Half Progressive Uniform Benefit
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Proportional Half and Half Progressive Uniform Benefit   41










































Proportional Half and Half Progressive Uniform Benefit   42




























































Proportional Progressive Half and Half Uniform Benefit   43




























































No Equity 25% Equity 50% Equity 75% Equity All Equity
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95 to 5 by 2.0 83.75 to 16.25 by 1.5 72.5 to 27.5 by 1.0 Constant 50% Equity   45   
Decile Current Law Proportional Progressive Half and Half Uniform
1 22033 13220 13739 14949 16678
2 23851 14311 14666 15494 16678
3 25127 15076 15317 15877 16678
4 26212 15727 15870 16203 16678
5 27227 16336 16388 16507 16678
6 28181 16908 16874 16793 16678
7 29177 17506 17382 17092 16678
8 30304 18182 17956 17430 16678
9 31726 19036 18682 17857 16678
10 34130 20478 19907 18578 16678
All 27797 16678 16678 16678 16678
Decile No Equity 25% Equity 50% Equity 75% Equity All Equity
1 2069 2532 3125 3884 4858
2 2840 3481 4307 5377 6769
3 3451 4226 5225 6516 8184
4 4015 4915 6075 7575 9524
5 4590 5621 6948 8659 10871
6 5234 6402 7896 9813 12278
7 5974 7321 9056 11298 14198
8 6901 8448 10435 12996 16302
9 8185 10021 12379 15426 19382
10 10498 12907 16008 20009 25171
All 5376 6587 8145 10155 12754
Decile No Equity 25% Equity 50% Equity 75% Equity All Equity
1 2069 2303 2570 2875 3220
2 2840 3166 3544 3981 4489
3 3451 3844 4298 4822 5424
4 4015 4471 4996 5604 6306
5 4590 5113 5715 6409 7206
6 5234 5822 6493 7259 8132
7 5974 6658 7446 8355 9401
8 6901 7681 8576 9605 10786
9 8185 9106 10164 11383 12793
10 10498 11715 13113 14713 16541
All 5376 5988 6692 7500 8430
Traditional Benefits
Real Annuities from 2% PRAs, Real Equity Returns Average 6.2%
Real Annuities from 2% PRAs, Real Equity Returns Average 4.7%
Appendix Table 1: Mean Benefits by Earnings Decile
 